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Abstract—While various covert Botnets were proposed in
the past, they still lack complete anonymization for their
servers/botmasters or suffer from slower communications among
the botmaster and bots. In this paper, we propose LNBot, a new
generation hybrid botnet that covertly communicates over Bitcoin
Lightning Network (LN) which was recently introduced as an
overlay network on top of Bitcoin for faster transactions. LNBot
is a scalable two-layer botnet designed to completely anonymize
the identity of the botmaster and its communication with multiple
command and control (C&C) servers which maintain their own
mini botnets by exploiting various anonymity features of LN.
Specifically, LNBot allows any type of commands to be sent
instantly by the botmaster to the C&C servers which are ASCII
or Huffman-encoded direct payments and forwarded via the LN
payment infrastructure. These commands can then be further
relayed to bots recruited by each C&C server. We implemented
a proof-of-concept on the actual Bitcoin network and analyzed
the delay and cost performance of the proposed approaches. We
then provide a list of potential countermeasures that can help
increase the chances of detecting LNBot and taking it down.
Index Terms—LN, botnet, covert channel, bitcoin
I. INTRODUCTION
Botnets are networks of computing devices infected with
malicious software that is under the control of an attacker,
known as bot herder or botmaster [1]. The owner of the
botnet controls the bots (i.e., devices that become part of the
botnet) through command and control (C&C) server(s) which
can communicate with the bots using a C&C channel and
can launch various attacks through these bots, including, but
not limited to, denial of service (DoS) attacks, information
and identity theft, sending spam messages, and other activi-
ties. Naturally, a botmaster’s goal is to make it difficult for
law enforcement to detect and prevent malicious operations.
Therefore, establishing a secure C&C infrastructure and hiding
the C&C server plays a key role in the long-lasting operation
of botnets. The underlying
Numerous botnets have been proposed and deployed in the
past [2] [3]. Regardless of their communication infrastruc-
ture being centralized or peer-to-peer, existing botnet C&C
channels and servers have the issue of remaining hidden
and resistant against legal authorities’ actions. Such problems
motivate hackers to always explore more promising venues for
finding new C&C channels with the ever-increasing number of
communication options on the Internet. One of such platform
is the environment where cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin,
is exchanged. As Bitcoin offers some degree of anonymity,
exploiting it as a C&C communication channel has already
been tried for creating a new botnet [4] [5]. While these botnets
addressed the long transaction validation times, they still
announce the commands publicly, where the botnet activity
can be traced by any observer with the help of the Bitcoin
addresses or nonce values of the transactions. Use of Bitcoin
for a botnet C&C leaves the history of malicious activity on
the blockchain forever.
Nonetheless, these issues related to the public announce-
ment of commands and leaving traces in the blockchain are
already being addressed in a newly developed Bitcoin payment
channel network called Lightning Network (LN). The LN
concept offers an appealing technical approach for making off-
line transactions (i.e., “off-chain” transactions which are not
announced and thus not recorded on the blockchain) in order
to speed up the transaction by eliminating the confirmation
time and decreasing fees associated with that transaction.
Additionally, users’ identities are still kept anonymous. In
this paper, we advocate LN as an ideal C&C infrastructure
for botnets with all the aforementioned features (i.e., faster
transactions, decreased costs). Specifically, LN offers botmas-
ters numerous advantages over existing techniques: First, LN
provides very high anonymity since transactions on the off-
chain channels are not recorded on the blockchain. Thus, a
botmaster can covertly communicate with the C&C server(s).
Second, the revelation of a server does not reveal other servers,
and an observer cannot enumerate the size of the botnet.
Most importantly, C&C communication over the LN cannot
be censored.
Although LN is a fast-growing emerging payment network,
it only has around 11K nodes which may not be ideal for
large-scale botnets. Therefore, we propose to use LN as an
infrastructure to maintain a network of C&C servers each of
which can run its own botnet. The use of multiple C&C servers
has been around for a while [6]. However, the communication
with these servers was still assumed to be through the exist-
ing communication infrastructures which impairs the servers’
anonymity. While Tor could be used as an option [7], it still
exposes the botnet activity due to recognizable patterns [8].
Therefore, further strengthening the anonymity is still needed.
Hence, this paper presents LNBot which is the first botnet
that utilizes LN infrastructure for its communications between
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the botmaster and C&C servers leading to a hybrid archi-
tecture. Specifically, a botmaster which is part of the LN
will maintain multiple C&C servers, which are also nodes
on the LN that have specialized software to control the bots
assigned to them. Essentially, each C&C server is controlling
an independent small-size botnet. These mini-botnets can be
controlled using a specific C&C infrastructure that might rely
on the LN itself as well as other traditional ones such as
stenography, IRC channel, DNS, Tor, etc. Botmaster sends
the commands to the C&C servers covertly through LN.
This 2-layer command and control topology not only enables
scalability but also minimizes the burden on each C&C server
which will reduce any potential suspicion on them.
To demonstrate the feasibility of the concept, we imple-
mented the LNBot in Bitcoin’s Testnet which is the actual
network for Bitcoin developers. Utilizing one-to-many archi-
tecture (i.e., botmaster sends commands to all C&C servers
separately), we show that by encoding the payments sent
over LN, one can successfully send commands to the C&C
servers that are part of the LN. These C&C servers further
relay those commands to the bots they control and these
commands can launch any type of attack to victim machines.
Nevertheless, as sending the commands to every C&C server
in the form of payment requires the botmaster to maintain high
capacity LN channels (i.e., increased monetary cost), we also
propose a mechanism to minimize this overhead. Specifically,
in addition to ASCII-based encoding, we propose a Huffman-
coding like encoding mechanism that considers the frequency
of characters that could potentially be used in constructing
attack commands. This minimizes the total cost of sending
the commands.
The analysis shows that LNBot could be very effective
in providing faster communications with little initial one-
time investment. Thus, we also provided a list of potential
countermeasures that may help detect potential LNBot activity
and minimize damages from it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Related
work is given in Section II. In Section III, we give some
background information about LN. In Section IV we describe
the design and construction of our proposed LNBot. Section V
is dedicated to proof-of-concept implementation in real world
settings while Section VI presents the evaluation results. In
Section VII, possible countermeasures for LNBot is discussed.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Botnets have been around for a long time and there have
been even surveys classifying them [9] [2]. While early botnets
used IRC, later botnets focused on P2P C&C for resiliency.
Our proposed LNBot can be fall under covert botnets which
became popular much later. As an example, Nagaraja et
al. proposed Stegobot, a covert botnet using social media
networks as communication channel [10]. Some work has been
done by Natarajan et al. to detect Stegobot [11]. Pantic et al.
proposed a covert botnet command and control using Twit-
ter [12]. Tsiatsikas et al. proposed SDP-Based Covert Channel
for Botnet Communication [13]. Calhoun et al. presented a
MAC layer covert channel based on WiFi [14].
Recent covert botnets started to utilize Blockchain although
these are very few. For instance, Roffel et al. [15] came
up with the idea of controlling a computer worm using the
Bitcoin blockchain. [16] discusses how botnet resiliency can
be enhanced using private blockchains. Pirozzi et al. presented
the use of blockchain as a command and control center for
new generation botnet [17]. These works are different from
our architecture as they suffer from the issues of latency
and anonymity. There are also Unblockable Chains [18], and
BOTRACT [19], which are Ethereum-based botnet command
and control infrastructures that suffer from anonymity issues
since the commands are publicly recorded on the blockchain.
Baden et al. [20] proposed a botnet C&C scheme utilizing
Ethereum’s Whisper messaging. However, it is still possible
to blacklist the topics used by the botmaster.
The closest work to ours is ZombieCoin [5]. It uses Bitcoin
transaction spreading mechanism as the C&C communication
infrastructure. In this study, the botmaster announces the
commands to the bots in terms of legitimate Bitcoin trans-
actions on the Bitcoin network. Then, any legitimate Bitcoin
nodes that receive these transactions check the correctness of
the input address, the digital signature, and in&out Bitcoin
amounts of the transaction. The bots extract the concealed
commands from these transactions. However, this scheme
has several drawbacks: First, the authors assumed that the
bots identify related transactions from the botmaster’s Bitcoin
address, which Bitcoin miners can blacklist. Second, because
all transactions are publicly announced, it leaves a public
record about the botnet activity. To resolve this problem, in
a further study they also proposed to employ subliminal chan-
nels [4] to cover the botmaster. However, subliminal channels
require a lot of resources to calculate required signatures which
is computationally expensive and not practical to use on a
large scale. Similarly, ChainChannels [21] utilizes Bitcoin to
disseminate C&C messages to the bots and these messages
remain on the blockchain, which is a public record of the
botnet activity. In contrast, our work is based on legitimate
LN payments and does not require any additional computation
to hide commands. Also, these commands are not announced
publicly. Finally, different from these architectures, LNBot
has a 2-layer hybrid architecture, which provides very high
anonymity.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Lightning Network
The LN concept is introduced in [22]. It includes a layer-2
payment protocol operating on top of Bitcoin. Through this
concept, an overlay payment network (i.e., LN) is started
among the customers and vendors in 2017. The aim in creating
the LN was to decrease the load on the Bitcoin network,
facilitating transactions with affordable fees and reduced
transaction validation times, and increasing the scalability of
Bitcoin by establishing peer-to-peer connections. Despite the
big fluctuations in the price of Bitcoin recently, the LN grew
exponentially reaching 11,402 nodes and 36,111 channels in
less than two years as of the writing of this paper [23]. In the
next subsections, we briefly explain the components of LN.
B. Off-chain Concept
The main idea behind LN is to utilize off-chain con-
cept [24] that enables near-instant Bitcoin transactions with
negligible fees. This is accomplished through bidirectional
payment channels which are created among two parties to
exchange funds without committing the transactions to Bitcoin
blockchain. Such a channel is opened by making a single
on-chain transaction called funding transaction. This funding
transaction determines the capacity of the channel. The chan-
nel can be used as many times as desired by both parties to
send payments to each other until the funds in the channel
have been exhausted. The example shown in Fig. 1 illustrates
this concept in more detail.
 Alice: 5
 Multisignature 
 Address: 5
Open a Channel 
Off-Chain
Transactions
Bob: 3
2
On-Chain
Transactions
 Alice: 5
 Alice: 1
 Multisignature 
 Address: 5
Close a Channel 
 Bob: 4
Alice: 4
Bob: 1 Bob: 4
11
Alice: 2 Alice: 1
Fig. 1. Off-chain mechanism of LN.
Per this figure, Alice opens a channel to Bob with a capacity
of 5 Bitcoins and the multi-signature address is signed by both
Alice and Bob. Using this channel, Alice can send payments to
Bob by transferring Bitcoins from the multi-signature address
until the funds in the address are exhausted. Note that these
transactions are off-chain meaning they are not written to the
Bitcoin blockchain, which is a unique feature of LN that
is exploited in our botnet. Alice performs 3 transactions at
different times with amounts of 1, 2 and 1 Bitcoin respectively.
Eventually, when the channel is closed, the remaining 1
Bitcoin on the multi-signature wallet is returned to Alice while
the total transferred 4 Bitcoins are settled at Bob. Channel
closing is also an on-chain transaction that broadcasts the latest
balances of Alice and Bob on the multi-signature address to
the blockchain.
C. Multihop Payments
In LN, a node can send payments to others even though
they are not directly connected. This is achieved by utilizing
multi-hop transaction forwarding as long as a path of payment
channels exists from source to the destination. Fig. 2 briefly
depicts the scheme. As there is a direct channel between Alice
and Carol and between Carol and Bob, Alice can forward a
transaction to Bob via Carol. In order for Alice to be sure
that the money is received by Bob, Alice prepares a payment
attached to a secret, H , answer of which is known by Bob.
Alice gives ownership of some of her money destined to Bob
if and only if Carol knows and discloses the answer to H
which is the hash of R. Likewise, Carol gives the ownership
of some of her money to Bob if Bob knows and discloses the
answer of H . Bob discloses the answer and gets his money.
Now, as Carol learned the answer, she discloses the answer
to Alice and gets her share. This mechanism is realized with
the “Hashed Time-Locked Contracts” (HTLC). Through this
mechanism of LN, as long as there is a path and channels
with enough capacities on the path from a payer to a payee,
payments can be routed, just like the Internet.
Alice Bob
CarolBidirectional
Payment Channel
Bidirectional
Payment Channel
RHH
Fig. 2. An illustration of a multihop payment. R is the secret number, H is
the hash of the secret both generated by the Bob.
D. Key Send
Key Send in LN enables instantaneous payments to a desti-
nation without needing to have an invoice first [25]. It utilizes
Sphinx [26] which is a compact and secure cryptographic
packet format that can be used to route messages over a mix
network. This is a very useful feature to have in LN because it
introduces new use cases where payers can send spontaneous
payments without contacting the payee first. In this mode, the
sender generates the preimage for a targeted payment instead
of the receiver and embeds it into the sphinx packet within the
outgoing HTLC. If a remote node accepts key send payments,
then it only needs to advertise its public key to receive these
payments from other nodes. in LNBot, we utilize this feature
to send payments from botmaster to C&C servers.
E. Source & Onion Routing
When multi-hop payment channels are available, routing
will be needed to select the best route to reach the destination.
LN utilizes source routing which gives nodes full control over
the route of their payments within the network. Senders are
able to specify: 1) the total number of intermediary nodes
(hops) in their routes, 2) total fee they will pay to send the pay-
ment, and 3) total time-lock period for the HTLC. Moreover,
LN has onion routing capability meaning that intermediate
nodes on the route know only their predecessor and successor
nodes. Additionally, payments are encoded within a mix-net
like [26] packet providing the following security and privacy
features:
1) Nodes within a route do not know the source and the
destination of the payment.
2) Nodes within a route do not know their exact hop position
within the route.
3) Nodes within a route do not know the total number of hops
in the payment route.
We note that these features along with LN’s decentralized
topology are important to provide anonymity as desired by
the botnets.
IV. DETAILS OF LNBOT
In this section, we describe the overall architecture of the
proposed LNBot with its elements.
A. Overview
The overall architecture is shown in Fig. 3. As shown, the
LN is used to maintain the C&C servers and their communi-
cation with the botmaster. Each C&C server runs a separate
mini botnet. Note that these botnets do not need to be under
LN and they can follow a different existing model. It is up to
the botmaster on how to populate these botnets.
LNBot Master
Server
Botmaster
C&C
Server C&C
Server
C&C
Server
LN
Layer
LN
Layer
LN
Layer
Lightning
Network
Bots
DNS
Bots
IRC
Mini Botnet
Mini Botnet
Bots
Tor
Mini Botnet
Fig. 3. Overview of LNBot Architecture
The botmaster could set up the C&C servers by creating LN
nodes at remote locations that are accessible to him/her. The
botmaster knows the LN public keys of all C&C servers since
s/he set them up. These public keys are needed to communicate
with them in the LN. Then s/he installs a special software on
the C&C servers which will be used to control the bots. In this
way, s/he only needs one malware and releases this malware
into the wild for infecting user machines and upon infection,
these machines connect to existing available C&C servers (i.e.,
they become bots). One possible way to achieve this would
be to spread the malware via embedded advertisements on
web pages frequently visited by intended victims. When a
viewer clicks on the link, s/he is redirected to a website hosting
malicious code that executes in the background and infects the
victim’s machine without his/her knowledge.
Upon infection, bots establish a communication with the
C&C server. The type of connection used depends on the
communication method chosen by the C&C servers. This can
be LN, Tor, DNS, IRC channel, HTTP, etc.
The botmaster’s commands have to be propagated into
every C&C server from which they are relayed to bots. For
this task, we propose one-to-many propagation where the
botmaster sends commands to each C&C server separately.
This approach is described in Section IV-E. The botmaster
periodically issues commands to C&C servers by making
payments over LN. Thus, the commands have to be encoded
into a series of LN payments. We implemented two encoding
schemes to represent the commands as LN payments. These
methods are detailed in Sections IV-F1 and IV-F2.
With the availability of command propagation, the C&C
servers could now listen to the incoming instructions from the
botmaster. Next, we describe the details of setting up the C&C
servers.
B. Setting up C&C Servers
As mentioned earlier, the botmaster can set up the necessary
number of C&C servers s/he would like to deploy. Depending
on the objectives, the number of these servers and the number
of bots they will control can be adjusted without any scalability
concern. In Section V, we explain how we set up 100 real C&C
servers running on LN on Bitcoin Testnet.
Each C&C server has a lightning wallet which needs to
be funded with some amount of Bitcoin. This is required for
servers to be able to open channels on LN. Botmaster funds
the lightning wallets of the C&C servers before deploying
them. We utilized at least 3 channels per server so that the
botmaster’s payments can find a route to any server easily.
C. Formation of Mini-Botnets
After C&C servers are set up, we need bots to establish
connections to C&C servers. A machine (bot) infected with
our malware will connect to one of the C&C servers available.
As mentioned earlier, the details of bot recruitment and imple-
mentation issues are beyond the objective of this paper. It is up
to botmaster to decide which type of infrastructure the C&C
servers will use to control the bots in their possession. This is
because it does not matter how C&C servers are controlling
the bots since revelation of a C&C server does not reveal the
other C&C servers nor the botmaster.
D. Forming LNBot
Now that C&C servers are set up, the next step is to form
the infrastructure to control these C&C servers covertly with
minimal chances of getting detected. This is where LN comes
into play. Botmaster has the public keys of all LN nodes
running on C&C server machines. This means, C&C servers
are ready to receive commands from the botmaster. Botmaster
uses an LN node called LNBot Master Server to initiate the
commands to all the C&C servers through LN payments.
Without using any other custom infrastructure, the botmaster
is able to control C&C servers through LN consequently
controlling all the bots on the botnet.
E. Command Propagation in LNBot
Once the LNBot is formed, the next step is to ensure
communication from the botmaster to the C&C servers. We
utilize a one-to-many architecture where the botmaster sends
the commands to each C&C server separately. The botmaster
uses key send method mentioned in Section III-D to send the
payments. In these interactions, the botmaster changes his/her
LNBot Master Server regularly. In other words, the botmaster
creates a new LN node and switches to it from time to time
to prevent being tracked from any time-based analysis.
We designed a basic connection-oriented protocol for
botmaster-to-C&C server communication as shown in Algo-
rithm 1:
Algorithm 1: Send Command
1 initialize command;
2 int counter = 0;
3 bool isOnline = checkIfC&CServerIsOnline();
4 if isOnline then
5 bool result = send(5 satoshi);
6 if result=success then
7 counter = 0;
8 for character in command do
9 bool result = send(character);
10 if result=success then continue;
11 else if result=fail and counter < k then
12 retry sending character;
13 counter++;
14 else reschedule(command, date, time);
15 end
16 counter = 0;
17 bool result = send(6 satoshi);
18 if result=success then
19 Command has been successfully sent!;
20 else if result=fail and counter < k then
21 retry sending 6 satoshi;
22 counter++;
23 else reschedule(command, date, time);
24 else if result=fail and counter < k then
25 retry sending 5 satoshi;
26 counter++;
27 else reschedule(command, date, time);
28 else
29 reschedule(command, date, time);
30 end
Before sending any payment, the botmaster first checks if
the respective C&C server is online or not (LN nodes have
to be online in order to send and receive payments). If the
C&C server is not online, command sending is scheduled for
a later time. Botmaster sends 5 satoshi1 as the special starting
payment of a command before it sends the actual characters
in the command one by one. Lastly, the botmaster sends 6
satoshi as the special ending payment to finish sending the
command. Note that selection of 5 and 6 in this algorithm
depends on the used encoding and could be changed based on
the needs. If any of these separate payments fail, it is retried.
If any of the payments fail for more than k times in a row,
command sending to the particular C&C server is canceled
and scheduled to a later time.
The details of encoding and decoding are explained next.
1A satoshi is defined to be 0.00000001 Bitcoin. In other words, 1 Bitcoin
is 100 million satoshi.
F. Encoding/Decoding Schemes
An important feature of LNBot is its ability to encode
botmaster commands into a series of LN payments. We used
two different encoding/decoding schemes for the purpose of
determining the most efficient way of sending commands to
C&C servers in terms of Bitcoin cost and time spent. We
explain the details of each method below:
1) ASCII Encoding: American Standard Code for Informa-
tion Interchange (ASCII) is a character encoding standard that
represents English characters as numbers, assigned from 0 to
127. Numbers 0-31 and 127 are reserved for control characters.
The remaining 95 codes from 32 to 126 represent printable
characters. The decimal equivalent of ASCII characters can
easily be looked up from an ASCII table.
2) Huffman Coding: When there is a need to losslessly
compress the information being sent over a channel, due to
its simple yet powerful approach, Huffman encoding is one
of the optimal options [27]. In usual communication systems,
the communication is done in binary domain. However, in
the communication scheme defined in our approach, there is
no strict need for binary communication. In the formation of
the Huffman tree, n−ary number systems can be used. The
advantage of n−ary numbering system over binary one is that
the messages can be distributed among more compact symbols,
hence the required number of transmissions per character will
be reduced.
In order to come up with a codebook, a dictionary is needed.
The frequencies, so-called probabilities of occurrences, of the
characters will shape the size of the codebook. In its most
frequently adapted style, users prefer to use bulky novels or
texts in order to simulate a more inclusive dictionary.
V. PROOF OF CONCEPT IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we demonstrate that an actual implementa-
tion of the proposed LNBot is feasible by presenting a proof
of concept. For development, we used lnd (version 0.9.0-beta)
which is one of the implementations of LN developed by
Lightning Labs [28]. This is a complete implementation of LN
protocol and currently can be used both on Bitcoin Testnet and
Mainnet as well as Litecoin Mainnet.
As a proof-of-concept, we built 100 C&C servers on Bitcoin
Testnet and assessed certain performance characteristics. We
created a GitHub page explaining the steps to set up the C&C
servers.2 The steps include installation of lnd & bitcoind,
configuring lnd and bitcoind, and configuring nodes to run
lnd over Tor. Note that we run our LN nodes over Tor not
to reveal their IP addresses and locations. We plan to keep
these 100 nodes running for interested readers to be able to
check our nodes’ details on LN search and analysis engines
such as https://1ml.com/, https://explorer.acinq.co/. Aliases of
our testnet nodes start with LNB prefix and appended with the
number of the node, as such LNB1, LNB2, ... , LNB100.3 We
2https://github.com/LightningNetworkBot/LNBot
3See LNB1, one of our testnet nodes with pubkey:
0355e35424a2ce2608aa7e6c9e020eaeaa65fb293b0b9debbeb60c4a0b6dac1cea
are also running 2 nodes on Bitcoin Mainnet. We put a screen
capture of details of our testnet node LNB1 in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Screen capture of details of our testnet node LNB1 from
https://1ml.com/testnet. It is a public node running on Tor network with 2
channels with a capacity of 0.006 Bitcoin and connected with 2 other nodes
on LN. Even though it is a public node, its location and IP address are hidden
since it is running on the Tor network.
lnd has a feature called autopilot which opens channels in
an automated manner based on certain initial parameters set
in advance [29]. C&C servers employ this functionality of lnd
to open channels on LN. In current implementation of lnd,
minimum allowable channel capacity is 20,000 satoshi. Using
autopilot, we opened 3 channels per server in order to have
good connectivity on LN.
lnd has an API for communicating with a local lnd instance
through gRPC [30]. Using the API, we wrote a client that
communicated with lnd in Python. Particularly, we wrote 2
Python scripts, one running on the C&C servers and the other
on the botmaster machine. We typed the command we wanted
to send to C&C servers in a terminal in the botmaster machine.
The command was processed by the python code and sent to
the C&C servers as a series of payments.
VI. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS OF LNBOT
In this section, we present the cost and time overhead
assessment of LNBot.
A. Metrics
To assess the overhead of LNBot, we used the following
two metrics:
• Cost: This metric refers to the monetary cost (i.e., in terms
of Bitcoin/satoshi) for the setup and operation of LNBot.
• Time: This metric measures the messaging, waiting and
computational times associated with the setup and operation
of LNBot.
B. Overhead Assessment of LNBot Formation
We first analyzed the overhead as a result of forming LNBot.
In other words, this is the non-recurring investment overhead
for LNBot. The major cost associated with LNBot formation
is mainly due to the need for funding the lightning wallets
of the C&C servers that are As noted earlier, we opened 3
channels per server in order to have a good connectivity on
LN. Therefore, a server needs 60,000 satoshi for opening these
channels. There are also on-chain transaction fees spent for
opening these 3 channels. An on-chain transaction fee might
be as low as 154 satoshi on Bitcoin Testnet4 and Bitcoin
Mainnet.5 We neglect the routing fees for multi-hop payments
since they are very low. So the total cost of opening these
channels will be 60,462 satoshi. A channel capacity of 20,000
is sufficient as long as the cost of sending a command to a
single server does not exceed 20,000 satoshi.
Now, let us calculate the total cost of setting up 100 C&C
servers. We already calculated that each server uses only
60,462 satoshi for channel creations. For 100 servers, this cost
is equal to 0.060462 Bitcoin (around $400 at current Bitcoin
price of $6700). This is a one-time non-recurring investment
cost of forming LNBot with 100 C&C servers which is a very
small amount considering the fact that each C&C server can
control tens of thousands of bots.
C. Overhead Assessment of Command Propagation
To assess the command propagation overhead, we per-
formed a SYN flooding attack using the following command
(omitting start and end of command characters):
sudo hping3 -i u1 -S -p 80 -c 10
192.168.1.1
We sent this command using both of the encoding meth-
ods we proposed earlier. For Huffman coding, we compared
several different base number systems. The best result was
obtained by using the Quaternary numeral system, codebook
of which is shown in Table I.
TABLE I
OBTAINED CODEBOOK FOR HUFFMAN CODING IN QUATERNARY
NUMERAL SYSTEM FOR THE COMMAND ‘SUDO HPING3 -I U1 -S -P 80 -C
10 192.168.1.1’
‘s’ 234 ‘n’ 233 ‘o’ 232 ‘h’ 231
‘d’ 224 ‘g’ 223 ‘c’ 222 ‘9’ 221
‘6’ 214 ‘2’ 213 ‘3’ 212 ‘u’ 211
‘p’ 144 ‘i’ 143 ‘8’ 142 ‘0’ 141
‘.’ 24 ‘1’ 12 ‘-’ 13 ‘E’ 4
‘ ’ 11 ‘S’ 3
Cost Analysis: Using ASCII encoding, the botmaster spent
2813 satoshi for command propagation. Table II gives details
about the number of payments and how many satoshi have
been sent in each payment. Since the command was sent
to 100 C&C servers, the botmaster spent 100x2813=281,300
satoshi (around $19 at current Bitcoin price of $6700) in
total. Maximum channel capacity allowed in lnd is 16,777,215
satoshi. Thus, it is enough for the botmaster to have only 1
4Check this transaction for instance:
fc46c99233389d24c4fd9517cd503f08265c517a6f0570d806e7cc98b7f7963b
It is one of our testnet nodes LNB6’s channel opening transaction with channel
Id 1735152493945290752.
5In a similar way, check this transaction:
1d81b6022ff1472939c4db730ca01b82d43b616e757d799aea17ee0db6427520
It is one of our mainnet nodes’ channel opening transaction.
TABLE II
RESPECTIVE ASCII AND HUFFMAN ENCODING REPRESENTATION OF
‘SUDO HPING3 -I U1 -S -P 80 -C 10 192.168.1.1’ COMMAND
Command ASCII Encoding Quaternary
Huffman Encoding
‘sudo ’ 115,117,100,111,32 2,3,4,2,1,1,2,2,4,2,3,2,1,1
‘hping3 ’ 104,112,105, 2,3,1,1,4,4,1,4,3,2,3,3
110,103,51,32 2,2,3,2,1,2,1,1
‘-i ’ 45,105,32 1,3,1,4,3,1,1
‘u1 ’ 117,49,32 2,1,1,1,2,1,1
‘-S ’ 45,83,32 1,3,3,1,1
‘-p ’ 45,112,32 1,3,1,4,4,1,1
‘80 ’ 56,48,32 1,4,2,1,4,1,1,1
‘-c ’ 45,99,32 1,3,2,2,2,1,1
‘10 ’ 49,48,32 1,2,1,4,1,1,1
‘192.168.1.1’ 49,57,50,46,49 1,2,2,2,1,2,1,3,2,4,1,2,2
54,56,46,49,46,49 1,4,1,4,2,2,4,1,2,2,4,1,2
Total Number of 44 108
Payments
Total Cost 2813 215
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Fig. 5. Amount of satoshi sent versus time for key send payments to reach
their destinations.
channel to be able to send (as long as there is a path) a total
of 281,300 satoshi to the C&C servers.
With Huffman coding, the botmaster spent 215 satoshi
which is much less. The details are shown in Table II. Again,
with 100 C&C servers, the total satoshi spent by the botmaster
is 100x215=21,500 (around $1.5 at current Bitcoin price of
$6700). This means a channel capacity of 21,500 satoshi
would be enough for SYN flooding attack. Therefore, Huffman
coding gives one the ability to perform more attacks without
creating high capacity channels.
Time Analysis: The propagation time of a command is
calculated by multiplying the number of payments with the
average delivery time of the payments.
To estimate the average delivery time, we sent 90 key send
payments from botmaster to our C&C servers over LN at
random times and measured the time it takes for payments
to reach their destinations. The results are depicted in Fig.
5. As shown, key send payments took 7 seconds on average
to reach their destinations and the maximum delay was never
exceeding 10 seconds. This delay varies since it depends on
the path being used and the load of each intermediary node in
the LN. We observed that the number of hops for the payments
was 4, which provides good privacy for the transactions.
Using an average of 7 seconds, the total propagation time
for ASCII-coded transactions is 7x44=308 seconds while it
is 7x108=756 seconds for Huffman coding. Huffman coding
reduces the costs but increases the communication delays
which is not critical in performing the attack.
VII. COUNTERMEASURES FOR LNBOT
In this section, we discuss possible countermeasures to
detect LNBot activities and minimizing its impacts.
• Taking LN down: Obviously, the simplest way to eliminate
LNBot’s activities is taking down the LN as a whole once there
is any suspicion about a botnet. However, this is very unlikely
due to LN being a very resilient decentralized payment channel
network. In addition, many applications are running on LN and
shutting down may cause a lot of financial loss for numerous
stakeholders.
• Compromising and shutting down a C&C Server: In LNBot
there are many C&C servers each of which is controlling a
mini botnet. Given the past experience with various traditional
botnets, it is highly likely that these mini botnets will be
detected at some point in the future paving the way for also
the detection of a C&C server. This will then result in the
revelation of its location/IP address and eventually physical
seizure of the machine by law enforcement. Nevertheless,
seizure of a C&C server will neither reveal the identity of
the LNBot botmaster nor other C&C servers since a C&C
server receives the commands through onion routed payments
catered with Sphinx’s mix-format, which does not reveal the
original sender of the message. Additionally, the communica-
tion between botmaster and C&C servers is 1-way meaning
that botmaster can talk to C&C servers but servers cannot talk
back since the LN address of the botmaster is not known by
them. This 1-way communication ensures that the identity of
the botmaster will be kept secret at all times. Eventually, taking
down a single C&C server shuts down the botnet partially
resulting in less damage to victims.
• Payment Flow Timing Analysis for Detecting the Botmaster:
Making a correlation-based traffic analysis in the Tor network
is proved to be a valid attack to anonymity [31]. By capturing
or owning the majority of the entrance and exit nodes, one
can detect the origin of most of the traffic by relating TCP/IP
requests and responses to each other. Such an analysis in
LN seems valid too. However, there is an additional barrier
in LN that the definitions for entrance and exit nodes do
not exist. As explained in Section III-E, intermediary nodes
in a payment path do not know the origin of the payment;
therefore they cannot distinguish between the botmaster and
a regular forwarding node on the payment path unless the
payment path just consists of 1-hops [32]. In our tests, we
observed that our payments took 4 hops to reach C&C servers.
Therefore, payment analysis for such multiple hops is a
challenge. However, it can help increase our chances to detect
the botmaster.
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Fig. 6. The payments that are forwarded by Node A and Node D are
monitored by an observer and the C&C server is compromised. Red arrows
show the payment channels between the nodes and the green arrows show the
flow of the payment.
To further investigate this attack scenario, a topology of
8 nodes was created on Bitcoin Testnet as shown in Fig. 6.
We assume that Node A, Node D and the C&C server are
compromised and thus we monitored their payments. In this
setup, a 100 satoshi payment was sent from the botmaster to
the C&C server through hops Node A, Node B, and Node C
and the payment was monitored at Node A. By monitoring
the node, we got the payment forwarding information shown
in Fig. 7.
"forwarding_events": [
    {
        "timestamp": "1579043693",
        "chan_id_in": "1826219544504369152",
        "chan_id_out": "1826219544504434688",
        "amt_in": "101",
        "amt_out": "100",
        "fee": "1",
        "fee_msat": "1000",
        "amt_in_msat": "101000",
        "amt_out_msat": "100000"
    }]
Fig. 7. The payment forwarding information stored on Node A’s local
database in JSON format as the output of the command lncli fwdinghistory.
In the same way, another 50 satoshi payment was sent from
the botmaster to the same C&C server following hops Node
D, Node E, and Node F and the payment was monitored at
Node D. Similar payment forwarding information is obtained
at node D. Here, particularly important information for us is
the timestamp of the payment, and the chan id in and the
chan id out arguments which represent the ID of the payment
channels that carry the payment in and out from Node A.
We can query these channel IDs to learn the public keys
of the nodes at both ends of the channel by running lncli
getchaninfo chan id. Obtained LN public keys at Node A, in
this case, belong to potential botmaster and Node B. In the
same way, LN public keys of potential botmaster and Node E
is obtained at Node D. After the payment is observed at Node
A, payment with the same amount was observed at the C&C
server. We now correlated these two payments (i.e., timing
analysis) and suspected that the sender to Node A (or D) can
be a potential botmaster. Obviously, there is no guarantee for
this (e.g., imagine a different topology where real botmaster
is 2 more hops away). We need to collect more data from
many compromised nodes and continue this analysis for a
long time. To increase the chances, well-connected LN nodes
could be requested to cooperate in case of law enforcement
investigation to share the timing of payments passing from
them.
In analyzing the payments received by the C&C server, we
can also supplement it by looking at the network packets. Since
the botmaster and the C&C servers run their LN nodes over
the Tor network, public LN nodes with an onion address are all
a candidate for being a member of the botnet. To this end, we
captured the network frames of the C&C server in Fig. 6 using
Wireshark to demonstrate what information can be obtained.
During the capture, 100 satoshi key send payments were sent
from botmaster to the C&C server and the C&C server is
connected to the LN through the Tor network. The captured
LN network frames at the C&C server, in this case, were all
encrypted with TLS v1.2 encryption and they were captured
at port 9001 which is a commonly used port for Tor’s network
traffic. Having a close look at the captured frames, all we could
see were several IP addresses from different countries that the
LN node has connected to while receiving the payments (see
Fig. 8).
Fig. 8. Wireshark capture of the network traffic of the C&C server in Fig. 6
In order to obtain the information carried in these LN
frames, they have to be deserialized and deserialization re-
quires the private key which is stored locally on the LN node.
Without having the private key, one cannot see the content of
the LN frames. However, at least receiving packets through
port 9001 could be an additional feature that will qualify the
collected payment to go under a timing analysis mentioned
above.
• Poisoning Attack: Another effective way to counter the
botmaster is through message poisoning. Basically, once a
C&C server is compromised, its public keys will be known.
Using these public keys one can send payments to C&C
servers to corrupt the messages sent by the botmaster at the
right time. There is currently no authentication mechanism
that can be used by the botmaster without being exposed to
prevent this issue. Recall that the commands are encoded in a
series of payments and when a different payment is sent during
a command transmission, it will corrupt the syntax and thus
eventually there will not be any impact. The right time will
be decided by listening to the payments and packets arriving
at the C&C server. The disadvantage of this, however, is that
one needs to pay for those payments. Nonetheless, this can
be an effective way to continue engaging with the botmaster
for detection purposes rather than just shutting down the C&C
server while rendering any attack impossible.
• Analysis of On-chain Payments: Another countermeasure
could be through analyzing the on-chain funding transfers
of C&C servers (i.e., channel creation transactions stored on
blockchain). For such forensic analysis, the Bitcoin addresses
of the C&C servers should be known. As with many other
real-life botnets, botmasters generally use Bitcoin mixers to
hide the source of the Bitcoins. Usage of such mixers makes
it very hard to follow the real source of the Bitcoins since
the transactions are mixed between the users using the mixer
service. Even though the chances of finding the identity of the
botmaster through this analysis is low, it can provide some
useful information to law enforcement.
VIII. CONCLUSION
LN has been formed as a new payment network to address
the drawbacks of Bitcoin transactions in terms of time and
cost. In addition to anonymity, LN reduces fees by performing
off-chain transactions. This provides a perfect opportunity for
covert communications as no transactions are recorded in the
blockchain. Therefore, in this paper, we proposed a new covert
hybrid botnet by utilizing the LN payment network formed
for Bitcoin operations. The idea was to control the C&C
servers through messages that are sent in the form of payments
through the LN. Furthermore, we designed a novel one-to-
many architecture for communication. The proof-of-concept
implementation of this architecture indicated that LNBot can
be successfully created and commands for attacks can be sent
to C&C servers through LN with very high anonymity. To
minimize LNBot’s impact, we offered several countermeasures
suggestions that include the possibility of searching for the
botmaster.
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